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O n l y  b y  e x t r i c a t i n g  r e l i g i o n  f r o m  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  f r o m  r e l i g i o n ,  c o u l d  
A m e r i c a n  c i t i z e n s  t r u l y  e n j o y  b o t h  t h e i r  f a i t h  a n d  d e m o c r a c y .  N o t  u n t i l  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y ,  
t h o u g h ,  w e r e  t h e  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  a n d  F r e e - E x e r c i s e  c l a u s e s  s e r i o u s l y  t e s t e d .  R e l i g i o n ,  t h e  S u p r e m e  
C o u r t ,  a n d  A m e r i c a n  p o l i t i c s  c o l l i d e d  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  h a l f  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y .  B e g i n n i n g  i n  
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s c h o o l s  a n d  m o d e r n  c o n c e r n s  r e g a r d i n g  r e l i g i o u s  f a i t h s  a n d  t h e  w o r k p l a c e .  T h e  r e a l  c h a l l e n g e  f o r  
t h e  C o u r t ,  t h o u g h ,  r e s u l t e d  f r o m  t h e  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  o f  r e l i g i o u s  l i b e r t i e s  a n d  c i v i l  r i g h t s ,  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h o s e  g r a n t e d  t o  r e d r e s s  l o n g  s t a n d i n g  r a c i a l  p r e j u d i c e s  i n  A m e r i c a n  h i s t o r y .  I t  w a s  
t h i s  j u x t a p o s i t i o n  t h a t  h a d  t h e  m o s t  s e r i o u s  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  m o d e r n  p o l i t i c s  a n d  d e b a t e s  
r e g a r d i n g  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e l i g i o u s  r i g h t s .  
B o b  J o n e s  U n i v e r s i t y  v .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  ( 1 9 8 3 )  [ B J U  v .  U . S . ] ,  a n d  t h e  d e c a d e  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  
p r e c e d i n g  i t ,  r e p r e s e n t s  o n e  s u c h  c o n f r o n t a t i o n .  B o b  J o n e s  U n i v e r s i t y  [ B J U ]  i s  a  h i g h l y  
c o n s e r v a t i v e ,  f u n d a m e n t a l i s t  C h r i s t i a n  s c h o o l  i n  S o u t h  C a r o l i n a .  I n  1 9 7 0 ,  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  
S e r v i c e  [ I R S ]  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  r e m o v e  t h e  s c h o o l ' s  t a x - e x e m p t  s t a t u s  d u e  t o  t h e  s c h o o l ' s  r a c i a l l y  
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  a d m i s s i o n ' s  p o l i c y .  A n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  C i v i l  R i g h t s '  A c t  i n  1 9 7 0  h a d  s p e c i f i e d  t h a t  
t a x - e x e m p t  p r i v a t e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t h a t  h e l d  r a c i a l l y  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  p o l i c i e s  c o u l d  l o s e  t h a t  s t a t u s  f o r  
v i o l a t i n g  p u b l i c  p o l i c y .  B J U  s u e d  t h e  I R S  o n  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  g r o u n d s  a n d  t h e  c a s e  w a s  
e v e n t u a l l y  h e a r d  b y  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  T h e  c a s e  i l l u s t r a t e s  h o w  t h e  n e w  
c o n s e r v a t i v e  C h r i s t i a n  m o v e m e n t s  o f  t h e  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  1 9 8 0 s  e n c o u n t e r e d  f e d e r a l  p o l i t i c s  a n d  l a w  
a n d  d e f i n e d  t h e  d e b a t e  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  c h u r c h  a n d  s t a t e  i n  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y .  
T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e b a t e  b e t w e e n  B J U  a n d  t h e  I R S  w a s  n o t  t r i g g e r e d  d i r e c t l y  b y  B J U ' s  
r a c i a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  a d m i s s i o n s  p o l i c y .  T h e  p r i m a r y  i s s u e  a t  s t a k e  w a s  w h e t h e r  a n  a g e n c y  o f  t h e  
f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e  I R S ,  h a d  t h e  l e g a l  a u t h o r i t y  t o  r e v o k e  t h e  t a x - e x e m p t  s t a t u s  o f  a  r e l i g i o u s  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  w h o s e  i n t e r n a l  p o l i c i e s  v i o l a t e d  p u b l i c  p o l i c y , , a n d  i f  d o i n g  s o  v i o l a t e d  t h a t  r e l i g i o u s  
i n s t i t u t i o n ' s  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  p r o t e c t i o n s .  T h e  i s s u e  t h a t  p r e c i p i t a t e d  t h e  r e v o c a t i o n  w a s  B J U ' s  
a d m i s s i o n s  p o l i c y ,  b u t  t h e  m o d e r n  C h r i s t i a n  c o n s e r v a t i v e  m o v e m e n t  w a s  d i v e r s e  a n d  s h o u l d  n o t  
b e  e q u a t e d  w i t h  o r  r e d u c e d  t o  r a c i a l l y  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  p o l i t i c s .  T h e  i s s u e  o f  r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  o r  
s e g r e g a t i o n  w a s  o n e  o f  g r e a t  s o c i a l  a n d  l e g a l  c o n c e r n  i n  t h e  m i d - t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y ,  a n d  t h e  I R S  
w a s  a c t i n g  o n  t h e  l a n g u a g e  a n d  i n t e n t  o f  t h e  r e c e n t l y  p a s s e d  C i v i l  R i g h t s  A c t  o f  1 9 7 0  t o  s u p p o r t  
i t s  c l a i m  t h a t  B J U ' s  a d m i s s i o n ' s  p o l i c y  v i o l a t e d  p u b l i c  p o l i c y .  T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h a l l e n g e ,  t h e n ,  
1  M a t t h e w  C .  M o e n ,  T h e  C h n s t i a n  R i g h t  a n d  C o n g r e s s  ( T u s c a l o o s a ,  A l a b a m a :  T h e  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  A l a b a m a  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 9 ) ,  2 7 .  
2  K e r m i t  L .  H a l l ,  e d . ,  M q j o r  P r o b l e m s  i n  A m e n c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  H i s t o r y ,  V o l u m e  I I :  F r o m  
1 8 7 0  t o  t h e  P r e s e n t  ( L e x i n g t o n ,  M a s s a c h u s e t t s :  D . C .  H e a t h  a n d  C o m p a n y ,  1 9 9 2 ) ,  4 6 2 .  
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was the result of conflict between public policy regarding civil rights and whether the First 
Amendment rights of a private, religious school precluded the federal government from revoking 
its tax-exemption privilege. 
Bob Jones College was founded in 1927 as a fundamentalist Christian college in Florida 
by Bob Jones Sr. After an interim move to Tennessee, it became Bob Jones University of 
Greenville, South Carolina in 1947.3 Until 1971, the school's admissions policy specifically 
excluded black applicants.4 At that time, BJU changed its policy to exclude only unmanied blacks 
largely in response to the notification received from the IRS: on July 10, 1970, the IRS had 
announced its intention to cease granting tax exemptions to organizations with racially 
discriminatory polides;S in a letter to BJU dated November 30, 1970, the IRS formally notified the 
University of the change in policy.6 The IRS's policy change came in response to Green v. Connalfy 
(1971),7 in which Mississippi parents of public school minors had petitioned that segregated 
private schools should not be eligible for tax-exempt status, as they perpetuated de facto 
segregation. The Court found in favor of the petitioners; a preliminary injunction against granting 
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools was issued in January 1970. The IRS's policy 
change was supported by the Court's re-characterization in Green of "charitable" (26 U.S.C. § 170) 
organizations in the IRS Code of 1954 § 501(c)(3) list of tax-exempt eligible entities to preclude 
those which have racially discriminatory policies. In 1971, the IRS formalized the policy by 
explicating that any organization, educational or otherwise, that accepted charitable donations 
would be governed by this policy.8 BJU fell into this category. 
The first suit involving the university and the IRS was actually adjudicated by the 
Supreme Court in 1974: Bob jones University v. Simon.9 BJU, having been notified of the IRS's 
change in policy and intent to revoke BJU's tax-exempt status, filed suit to enjoin the IRS, 
claiming First and Fifth Amendment violations. BJU argued that the IRS's actions represented 
government influence in the practice of faith and would impinge on the university's free exercise 
of their religiously based policies regarding racial separation. The District Court granted the 
injunction;to the Court of Appeals overturned, relying on a portion of the IRS Code that 
prevented petitioners from enjoining the IRS until it had actually assessed the taxes. The Supreme 
Court upheld the Appeals Court finding. The ruling in Simon demonstrated a statutory reliance on 
procedural law. Not until BJU 1'. U.S., though, would the substantive content of the constitutional 
issues be ruled upon. To appreciate the confluence of issues, it is important to set the stage. 
The Religious Right political constituency, variably referred to as Christian, 
Fundamentalist, or Evangelical Conservatives, was not fully apparent until the late 1970's, when 
they coalesced, briefly, around the born-again Baptist Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter, and 
more permanently, the Republican party of Ronald Reagan. It is important to note the distinction 
between "evangelical" and "mainline Protestants." The political movement that is commonly 
referred to as the Religious Right is largely comprised of socially conservative Protestant 
denominations including the Southern Baptist Convention, Churches of Christ, and Assemblies 
http:/ f',vww.bju.edu/ about/history/; http:/ /www.bju.edu/about/history /gville.hrml, 
accessed May 2008. 
4461 u.s. 574 (1983), 580. 
5 Steven C. Schroer, "Applicability of Prohibition of Suits to Restrain Assessment and 
Collection of Taxes to Revocation of Tax Exemptions under Section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code," Columbia Law Review. 73, no. 7 (Nov 1973): 1502. 
u 461 U.S. 574 (1983), 581. 
7 330 F. Supp. 1150 
8 Mayer G. Freed and Daniel Pols by, "Race, Religion and Public Policy." The Supreme 
Court Review. Vol. 1983 (1983): 5. 
9 416 U.S. 725 (1974) 
10 Schroer, 1502. 
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of God.1 1 The impetus for the convergence was, broadly speaking, a general sense among socially 
conservative Protestants that they were being attacked by an increasingly secularized culture. The 
Christian Conservative political movement claimed that the state was denying its "Christian 
heritage" by legislating or adjudicating in a manner that, they argued, violated their First 
Amendment protections. The sense of secularization was reinforced by numerous Coutt 
challenges to religious practices, the cultural ramifications of desegregation and the civil rights 
movement, censorship by the Federal Communications Commission of religious programming,12 
the well-documented abortion debate, and finally, what was perceived as a direct affront upon the 
freedom to practice religion in the BJU v. U.S. case. 
The first notable challenge to the religion clauses of the First Amendment came in 
Everson v. Board ofEducation,13 (1947). In this case the Supreme Coutt upheld a New Jersey state 
statute authorizing the use of public taxpayer money to bus school children to Catholic schools. 
Justice Hugo Black's opinion was restrained, though, "The First Amendment has erected a wall 
between church and state ... We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not 
breached it here."14 The dissent used this very restraint to argue that the opinion should have 
been just the opposite, indicating the precarious nature of resolving First Amendment religious 
debates. Fifteen years later, the Coutt succeeded in "nationalizing" the First Amendment by 
overturning New York and Pennsylvania state laws implementing prayers in public schools.15 In 
Engel v. Vitale, 16 (1962) and School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp,n (1963) the 
Court found school sanctioned prayers unconstitutional by incorporating the First Amendment 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. State sponsored Christian prayer in the public school seemed an 
obvious violation of the separation between church and state. 
The Court was not engaging in an outright attack on religious protections, though. For 
instance, in Sherbert v. Vemer18 (1963), which was decided during the same session as Schempp, the 
Court ruled that the state could not deny the petitioner's unemployment claim as she had left her 
job because it required her to work on Saturdays, and her Seventh-Day Adventist faith observed 
Saturdays as the Sabbath. 19 The Court's early decisions involving the establishment and free-
exercise clauses were carefully carving out the delicate balance between religious freedoms and 
state control. 
After the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, many southerners had begun to 
privatize the education of their children to circumvent the mandated desegregation of the public 
school system. Court rulings regarding school prayer, bussing, evolution, and the general cultural 
liberalization of the 1960s, furthered the trend toward private, especially Christian, schools into 
the 1970s.2° Contrary to popular history, Protestants did not overwhelmingly coalesce against Roe 
v. Wade (1973). In fact, the highly conservative Southern Baptist Convention in 1971 passed, and 
in 1974 and 1976 affirmed, a resolution that approved abortion under certain conditions: rape, 
incest, fetal deformity, or the well-being of the mother,21 a position contrary to other Protestants 
11 Frank Lambert, Religion in American Politics (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), 185. 
12 Moen, 23-25. 
13 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
14 Hall, Problems, 471. 
15 Kermit L. Hall, Paul Fink! em an, and James W. Ely, Jr., eds., American Legal History: 
Cases and Materials (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 542. 
16 370 U.S. 421 (1962) 
17 374 u.s. 203 (1963) 
18 374 u.s. 398 (1963) 
19 Freed, 21. 
20 Moen, 26. 
21 Randall Balmer, God in the White House: A History: How FaithS haped the Presidency from 
John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush (New York, New York: Harper One, 2008), 94. 
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groups, but in line with the smaller segment of socially liberal Protestants. The abortion debate 
did not unify all Christians in opposition. The issues that unified Christian political interests were 
broader and not motivated by protecting specific religious doctrines; rather it seemed that the 
Religious Right became unified against this perceived secularization of America and the Court's 
encroachment on religious practices in private institutions. 
Arguably, it was in fact the IRS's attack on BJU that commenced the unified 
politicization of the Christian Right.22 Bob Billings, founder of Christian School Action, 
remarked in regards to the IRS's actions against BJU, "'The IRS ignited the dynamite [within the 
fundamentalist community] that had been lying around for years."'23 Social changes and Court 
decisions had formalized the secular nature of public schools, forcing Christians to seek private 
institutions to inculcate their moral and religious beliefs, and now the government via the IRS was 
directly attacking the private, religious educational institutions they had created to provide refuge 
by attempting to revoke the financially beneficial tax-exempt status of their religious schools. 
On April 16, 1975, the IRS formally notified BJU of the pending revocation of its tax-
exempt status, and on January 19, 1976, the exemption was officially revoked. In the meantime, 
on May 29, 1975, BJU updated its admissions policy to allow married and unmarried black 
applicants. However, the university maintained a disciplinary rule that prohibited any interracial 
dating or marriage, or advocacy thereof, on penalty of expulsion.24 To surpass the procedural 
arguments addressed in Simon, BJU paid $21 in taxes and then promptly filed a refund request. 
The denial of this request, due to BJU's new, non-exempt status, triggered a counterclaim from 
the IRS and associated Constitutional arguments. 
BJU argued that the IRS did not have the Constitutional authority to revoke tax-
exemption based on the literal reading of§ 501 (c)(3); that authority was reserved to the Congress 
to specifically legislate and delegate to the IRS to enforce. Any interpretation by the IRS of 
Congressional intent not explicitly stated was influenced not by legal standards, but rather by 
social standards. Also, as argued in Simon, BJU claimed that the revocation actually violated the 
university's rights under the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Because BJU's rules and 
teachings regarding the segregation of races were rooted in their interpretations of biblical text, 
the university argued that the IRS's policy violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of 
religious expression. Furthermore, BJU claimed that the IRS's actions represented an attempt to 
control the specific policies of a religious institution, an action prohibited by the establishment 
clause. 
BJU did not attempt to defend their racially discriminatory policies. Efforts to excuse 
the interracial dating ban by claiming it affected both white and black students equally could be 
easily defeated: first, the school had only changed its admissions policy in response to the IRS's 
notification of its new tax-exemption policy; and second, inherent in their reasoning against 
interracial relationships, underscored by their only recently amended total exclusion, was that 
black students were considered less desirable or unworthy of association in their white, 
fundamentalist Christian school. In fact, Bob Jones III is quoted as saying, "The question is not 
whether we are discriminatory. We are, and we have never tried to hide the fact."25 Asked for a 
reference to support the school's racial separatism, a BJU student offered, "It is in the Bible. It 
says you should not be unequally yoked."26 The verse referenced by this student reads in entirety 
"Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what fellowship hath righteousness 
with unrighteousness? and what communion hath light with darkness?"27 It appears, then, that 
22 Lambert, 197. 
23 Moen, 27. 
24 461 U.S. 574 (1983), 580-581. 
25 "Religious School is in Tax Battle over Policy of Racial Separatism," New York Times, 
January 26, 1981, Monday, Late City Final Edition, sec. A, p. 18. 
26 Ibid. 
27 2 Corinthians 6:14, The Holy Bible, Authorized King James Version. 
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the university's doctrine equated black students with "unbelievers." The student's justification 
expressed an attitude, not a legal defense, but clearly indicates the religious underpinnings of 
BJU's policies and why the university argued that the IRS was infringing upon their free-exercise 
rights. 
The government's position was complicated by the Reagan administration's changing 
opinions. Part of Reagan's Republican Party Platform in 1980 had been the promise to do away 
V.'ith the "unconstitutional regulatory vendetta launched by Mr. Carter's IRS commissioner against 
independent schools."2S In January 1982, the Reagan Administration made good on its campaign 
promise and announced that it had shifted its support in this matter to BJU's claim: the IRS did 
not have the authority to enforce "social law" without Congressional legislation specifically to that 
intent.29 The President had been influenced by conservative Republicans Presidential Advisor 
Edwin Meese III, Senator Strom Thurmond, and Representative Trent Lott,3° representatives of 
the Christian Right that had been Reagan's strongest constituency in his recent election. 0. Jack 
Taylor, Jr., an attorney for BJU, was, unsurprisingly, happy with the Administration's new 
position. The policy change complemented BJU's argument that the tax laws were not intended 
to enforce unspecified public policy.31 
In a letter protesting the Administration's new stance, over 200 lawyers and members 
of the Justice Department's own civil rights division admonished the President, "Many of these 
schools were established for the purpose of perpetuating racial segregation in communities which 
were in the process of desegregating their schools pursuant to the requirements of Federallaw."32 
Congressional and community civil rights leaders saw the Reagan Administration's move as an 
affront to the successes of the Civil Rights Movement of the previous three decades.33 President 
reacted quickly. On January 18, 1982, he sent a bill to Congress that would deny tax-
exe:mt)ti<ms to private schools that racially discriminate.34 In forwarding a bill for Congressional 
review and approval, President Reagan did not contradict his recent change in position, but rather 
bolstered his claim that clarifying the meaning and intent of the IRS code was a Congressional 
matter, not an IRS authority, while acting quickly to assuage critics that saw his previous move as 
wrong-headed in regards to civil rights. 
William T. Coleman, Jr. was appointed by the Supreme Court in April1982 to argue the 
government's position, since the Administration no longer represented the IRS in the matter.35 
The main argument offered by Coleman was that the racially discriminatory policies of BJU 
violated public policy and law. Where the IRS code was not explicit, the intent could be inferred 
28 Martin Schram and Charles R. Babcock, "Reagan Advisors Missed School Case 
Sensitivity," The Washington Post, January 17, 1982, Sunday, Final Edition, sec. Al. 
29 Ibid; Freed, 1; Ark Press and Diane Camper, "Religion, Race and Taxes," Neu,sweek, 
October 25, 1982, United States Edition, sec. "Justice," p. 102; and, Walter Shapiro and Diane 
Camper, "Reagan's Civil Rights Woes," Newsweek, june 6, 1983, United States Edition, sec. 
"National Affairs," p. 38. 
30 Schram, The Washington Post, January, 17, 1982; Howell Raines, "President Shifts View 
on Tax Rule in Race Bias Case," New York Times, January 13, 1982, Wednesday, Late City Final 
Edition, sec. A, p. 1. 
3l "U.S. Tax Rule Shift Applauded and Attacked," New York Times, January 9, 1982, 
Saturday, Late City Final Edition, sec. 1, p. 10. 
32 
"Text of Letter on Exemptions," New York Times, February 3, 1982, Wednesday, Late 
City Final Edition, sec. A, p. 21. 
33 Raines, New York Times, January, 13, 1982. 
34 Lee Lescaze, "Reagan Submits Bill on Schools," 'The Washington Post, January 19, 
1982, Tuesday, Final Edition, sec. At; Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan Acts to Bar Tax Break to 
Schools in Racial Bias Cases," New York Times, January 19, 1982, Tuesday, Late City Final Edition, 
sec. A, p. 1. 
35 Stuart Taylor, Jr., "Reagan is Opposed in Racial Bias Case," New York Times, August 
26, 1982, Thursday, Late City Final Edition, sec. B, p. 9. 
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from other Congressional actions; the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
and the Federal Housing Act36 revealed a legislative commitment to civil rights and racial 
nondiscrimination. As was argued in Brown, there was also recognition of the keen importance of 
nondiscrimination in education. In a friend of the court brief, Harry K. Mansfield of the National 
Association of Independent Schools wrote, "Racial discrimination is not only sociaily inadmissible 
but also educationally deleterious."37 
The implicit conclusion drawn by the IRS from such legislative acts was bolstered by 
case precedent. Green had established an expanded definition of "charitable" that encompassed 
BJU, and supported the argument that racially discriminatory policies precluded the university, 
since it accepted charitable donations, from tax-exemption. In Norn,ood v. Harrison3B (1973) the 
Court found that offering free textbooks to segregated :\fississippi private schools amounted to 
tangible financial assistance that violated the State's constitutional requirements to prohibit racially 
segregated schools. Racially discriminatory admissions policies in education were directly 
confronted in &nyon v. McCrary39 (1976). Two Virginia private schools were found to be in 
violation of a federal statute protecting the rights of all persons within the U.S., regardless of race, 
to make and enforce contracts. &nyon effectively illegalized racially discriminatory policies in 
nonsectarian private schools.4D It was during the litigation of this matter that BJU opened its 
admissions policy regarding blacks, but maintained the prohibition of interracial relationships.41 
To make the above decisions applicable against BJU, though, the First Amendment 
claims would have to be addressed. The IRS rebutted the charge that revocation of tax-exempt 
status prevented or prohibited BJU's religious beliefs or practice thereof; it merely removed a 
government sanctioned tax privilege because of the organization's failure to comply with law and 
social policy. The need to protect civil rights and prevent racial discrimination in society 
outweighed BJU's claim to entitlement of a special tax status. 
The decision in Bob Jones University v. United Statefl2 was announced on May 24, 1983. 
The Court ruled in favor of the IRS's revocation of the tax exemptions. The 8-1 majority opinion 
was written by Chief Justice Warren Burger. The basic premises for the conclusion are faithful to 
Coleman's arguments for the IRS: an organization's eligibility for tax exemption cannot 
contradict "common community conscience" or "established public policy;" regardless of 
whether the organization's rationale is religiously based, racial discrimination contradicts public 
policy; the IRS acted within its authority and properly applied it to both petitioners in the case; 
and, the "compelling government interest" in "eradicating racial discrimination in education" 
outweighs the First Amendment free-exercise claims of the petitioners." 
The concurring opinion of Justice Powell and the dissent of Justice Rehnquist are 
especiaily enlightening to the struggle between social policy and religious liberties. Justice Powell 
agreed with the ultimate outcome of the majority opinion: eliminating racial discrimination in 
education was an imperative concern to be weighed heavily. However, relying on "the common 
community conscience" to sanction the IRS's authority to interpret tax code based on social 
norms set a dangerously broad precedent. Tax-exempt organizations serve a public purpose by 
encouraging diverse viewpoints to the public discourse. For the Court to rule that the 
government has the authority to enforce social policy without explicit Congressional instruction 
weakens the legislative representation of a diverse American population.44 Senator Jesse Helms 
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represented the dissent to Congress with this very point: the Supreme Court had circumscribed 
legislative authority by effectively amending the IRS code with the BJU v. US decision.45 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent was quite similar to Justice Powell's concurrence. He also 
expressed agreement that eliminating racial discrimination in education was a necessary goal. His 
similar reasoning led him to a different result. The Supreme Court was not "constitutionally 
empowered"46 to circumvent Congressional authority and effectively legislate on a social policy. 
The Court's reliance on "public policy" and common-law readings of "charitable contributions" 
signaled not an opportunity for the Court to act, but rather as a directive to Congress to address 
the conflict between civil rights, religious liberties, and tax codes. 
The public reaction to the decision was equally nuanced. Bob Jones III offered an 
extreme warning to his students, "We're in a bad fix in America when eight evil old men and one 
vain and foolish woman can speak a verdict on American liberties ... You no longer live in a 
nation that is religiously free." 47 President Reagan simply said, "We will obey the law."48 In a 
brief ftled with the ACLU, the American Jewish Committee argued that the constitutional 
mandate to eliminate "government-supported race discrimination in education" far outweighed 
any First Amendment claims of the schools involved,49 and therefore validated the Court's ruling. 
Protestant Church officials were divided by the opinion. Most, like William P. Thompson, CEO 
of the United Presbyterian Church, agreed that the decision upheld "the principle of a nonracist 
culture" but worried what the ruling would mean for the First Amendment protected "free 
exercise" clause, specifically the separation between church and state when religious beliefs differ 
from public policy in areas other than racial discrimination. so 
The fine distinctions in the analysis of the official decision are reflected by the 
conflicted concerns expressed by religious leaders: the Court's ultimate result, to deny tax benefits 
to racially discriminatory organizations, is positive. However, as Justice Powell's concurring 
opinion and Justice Rehnquist's dissent illustrate, the rationale offered in the majority opinion set 
a potentially dangerous precedent for replacing proper Congressional legislative remedies with 
Judicial jurisdiction over, albeit in this case, valid, social or public concerns, threatening the 
Constitutional guarantees for the protection of religious freedoms. The IRS Tax Code has since 
been modified to reflect the sentiment of the ruling. Private educational organizations, regardless 
of religious or secular affiliation, are required to comply with the "Racially Nondiscriminatory 
Policy" in order to obtain and maintain a tax exempt status_51 
The long legal battle that culminated in BJU v. U.S. had significantly contributed to the 
unification of a large constituency of Protestant Christian conservatives in the Republican 
campaign of 1980, a demographic that has maintained considerable political influence since. In 
1993, Congress responded to the concerns of Christians by passing the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA]. The act strengthened the "compelling interest" test in favor of First 
Amendment guaranteed religious freedoms, maintaining that the government must have a distinct 
interest in the general law to override an individual's religious practices that disagree with that 
law.52 The inspiration for the act had been the ongoing conflict between religious liberties, 
government interest, and public policy illustrated in the BJU v. U.S. case. The direct impetus, 
however, was the Court's ruling in Employment Division v. Smith (1990),53 in which Oregon's 
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jurisdiction to outlaw the religious use of peyote was upheld. RFRA was not the end of the 
debate, though, as it was overturned in 1997 by City of Boerne v. Flores. 54 In Flores, the Court held 
that RFRA's incorporation of the First Amendment over state law by the Fourteenth Amendment 
represented an overextension of Congressional enforcement powers because it attempted to define 
First Amendment guarantees rather than simply protect them. 
The political potency of the case was apparent again in the presidential campaign of 
2000. George W. Bush accepted an invitation to speak at Bob Jones University and was criticized 
in the media and by his Republican opponent, John McCain, for endorsing an instirution that still 
maintained a prohibition against interracial relationships. Bush claimed he was not aware of the 
policies of the university. In response to the media attention surrounding the campaign 
controversy, BJU's president, Bob Jones III, announced during a March 3, 2000, appearance on 
the Larry King Live show, that effective immediately the interracial dating policy would end.55 
BJU now has a "Nondiscriminatory Policy" on the Admissions page of its website.56 On 
November 21, 2008, the Associated Press reported that BJU's president, Stephen Jones, grandson 
of founder Bob Jones, had issued an official apology for the university's past policies regarding 
race.57 The school's website now includes a page explaining the university's new position.ss In 
the statement, the previous policies regarding race are repudiated as un-Christlike and are blamed 
on the heritage of "the segregationist ethos of American culture" at The major organization 
is still not tax-exempt. 
The debate surrounding Bob Jones Univ. v. United States can be seen as a transition to an 
active Christian constiruency in American politics. But more importantly, the case represents a 
national discussion about how to balance civil rights and the religious freedoms protected by the 
First Amendment. The decision itself reflects the influences of the past wrongs of racial 
discrimination in the United States and the Supreme Court's efforts to reconcile civil rights "rith 
religious liberties. The reactions to it reveal the rise of a Religious Right, conservative movement 
in U.S. party politics. Within it are apparent long standing concerns regarding the balance of 
powers between the three branches of government, and how to appropriately balance and define 
the Constirutional rights of American citizens. 
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